Recent advances in large-scale distributed learning algorithms have enabled communication-efficient training via SIGNSGD. Unfortunately, a major issue continues to plague distributed learning: namely, Byzantine failures may incur serious degradation in learning accuracy. This paper proposes ELECTION CODING, a coding-theoretic framework to guarantee Byzantine-robustness for SIGNSGD WITH MAJORITY VOTE, which uses minimum worker-master communication in both directions. The suggested framework explores new information-theoretic limits of finding the majority opinion when some workers could be malicious, and paves the road to implement robust and efficient distributed learning algorithms. Under this framework, we construct two types of explicit codes, random Bernoulli codes and deterministic algebraic codes, that can tolerate Byzantine attacks with a controlled amount of computational redundancy. For the Bernoulli codes, we provide upper bounds on the error probability in estimating the majority opinion, which give useful insights into code design for tolerating Byzantine attacks. As for deterministic codes, we construct an explicit code which perfectly tolerates Byzantines, and provide tight upper/lower bounds on the minimum required computational redundancy. Finally, the Byzantine-tolerance of the suggested coding schemes is confirmed by deep learning experiments on Amazon EC2 using Python with MPI4py package.
Notations: The sum of elements of vector v is denoted as v 0 . Similarly, M 0 represents the sum of elements of matrix M. An n × n identity matrix is denoted as I n . The set {1, 2, . . . , n} is denoted by [n] . An n × k all-one matrix is denoted as 1 n×k . For a given set S, the identification function 1 {x∈S} outputs one if x ∈ S, and outputs zero otherwise.
II. SYSTEM MODEL

A. Distributed Learning using SIGNSGD WITH MAJORITY VOTE (SIGNSGD-MV)
Here we review distributed learning algorithms which use SIGNSGD WITH MAJORITY VOTE [21] , [22] . Consider a distributed learning system using n workers. We divide the training data into n partitions, denoted as {D i } i∈ [n] . The gradient vector computed from data partition D i is denoted as g i = [g i,1 , g i,2 , · · · , g i,d ] where d is the dimension of parameter space Ω. For a specific coordinate l ∈ [d], the set of gradient elements computed for n data partitions is denoted as g (l) = [g 1,l , g 2,l , · · · , g n,l ]. A message vector m (l) is defined as the sign of g (l) in a binary format, i.e., m (l) = [m 1,l , m 2,l , · · · , m n,l ] where m i,l ∈ {0, 1}. We also define the majority opinion as µ (l) = maj(m (l) ), where maj(·) is a majority function which outputs the more frequent element in the input argument vector. We update the model parameter as ω s+1 = ω s + γµ, where γ is the learning rate and µ = [µ (1) , · · · , µ (d) ]. 6 
B. ELECTION CODING framework
The suggested ELECTION CODING framework for estimating the majority opinion µ (l) is illustrated in Fig. 1a . Since we consider coordinate-wise encoding and decoding, we focus only on one dimension; we shall drop the index l. The binary message vector m (l) is now simply denoted as m = [m 1 , · · · , m n ], and the majority opinion µ (l) as µ = maj(m). This paper suggests applying codes for allocating data partitions into worker nodes. We assume that n is an odd number, in order to avoid ambiguity at the output of the majority function. We define data allocation matrix G ∈ {0, 1} n×n as follows: G ji = 1 if data partition i is allocated to node j, and G ji = 0 otherwise. Then, we define P j = {i ∈ [n] : G ji = 1}, the set of data partitions assigned to node j. Given a data allocation matrix G, the computational redundancy compared to the naive uncoded scheme is expressed as r = G 0 /n, the average number of data partitions handled by each node. Note that the uncoded scheme corresponds to G = I n . Once node j computes {m i } i∈P j from the assigned data partitions, it generates a binary information c j = E j (m; G)
using encoder E j . We use the notation c = [c 1 , · · · c n ] for n bits generated by the worker nodes.
After generating c j ∈ {0, 1}, node j transmits 1
to PS, where X is either c j ⊕ 1 or c j since each node is allowed to transmit either 0 or 1.
Following the related work [17] , [22] , we assume that the number of Byzantine nodes satisfy b ∈ {0, 1, · · · , n/2 }. The maximum number of Byzantines is denoted as b max = n/2 . After an arbitrary attack of b Byzantines, PS observes y = [y 1 , y 2 , · · · , y n ] and estimates µ using a decoding function D : y →μ.
In Fig. 1b , we illustrate an example of the suggested framework used for a voting scenario where n voters vote for either bit 1 or bit 0. Each polling station observes the votes corresponding to some subset of voters. Assume that each polling station must send the central election commission a single bit most representative of its local votes. A natural choice is to find the majority. Some 1 Since a Byzantine node behaves arbitrarily, it may transmit nothing, or it may be a straggling node. Note that ELECTION CODING is also tolerant to this scenario; when a coding scheme guarantees the master to correctly estimate the majority opinion µ under bit flip attacks, it trivially guarantees the correct estimate at the master under bit erasure scenarios as well. In the example of Fig. 1b , the master successfully obtainsμ = 0 even when the Byzantine node transmit nothing instead of sending wrong information y5 = 1. 7 polling stations may turn out to be Byzantines, arbitrarily changing the voting results. The master wishes to estimate the majority vote of the original n voters by observing the majority of the majority votes compiled by n polling stations, some of which may be Byzantines. The example in the figure shows that although a Byzantine station flips a bit, the master can still accurately estimate µ. In this example, coding amounts to telling each voter to go to which polling stations.
By sending each voter to multiple stations in some predefined way, the voting system becomes resistant to Byzantine attacks to change the majority voting results of the polling stations.
C. Target Problem
Coming back to the distributed gradient computation problem, there are three key system design parameters which affect the accuracy in estimating µ: the task allocation matrix G, the encoder functions {E j } j∈[n] at n worker nodes, and the decoder function D at the master. In this paper, we focus on low-complexity hierarchical voting where both the encoder and the decoder are majority voting functions:
µ = D(y) = maj(y 1 , y 2 , · · · , y n ).
Under this setting, we define the Byzantine tolerance of a given system as follows. with G ji ∼ Bern(p). The idea of randomly contacting messages at each coded bit has been considered in previous work on fountain codes [38] and Bernoulli gradient codes [35] . However, using this idea for tolerating Byzantines in distributed learning is something entirely different and requires unique analysis. Note that depending on the Byzantine attack scenario, flexible code construction is available by adjusting the connection probability p.
A. Estimation Error Bound for Random Bernoulli Codes
For a random Bernoulli code, the error probability P(μ = µ) of estimating the majority value µ is bounded as follows.
Theorem 1. Consider assigning data partitions into n nodes using data allocation matrix G generated by i.i.d. Bernoulli random variables with G ji ∼ Bern(p) for some p > 0. Let b be the number of Byzantine nodes. Then, in the asymptotic regime of large n, the system is (b, δ)-Byzantine tolerable, i.e., the error probability is upper bounded as
where δ is the probability of having more than n/2 − b nodes outputting wrong estimates on the majorities, which can be expressed as
with
Proof. The full proof is given in Appendix B; here we just provide a sketch. Consider an arbitrary 2 message vector m having weight m 0 = ω ≤ n/2 . Then, the majority opinion is µ = 0.
2 For message vectors with m 0 > n/2 , a similar approach gives us the same result; the only difference is µ = 1. 9 Thus, the estimation error event occurs when more than n/2 nodes transmit y = 1, resulting in µ = 1. We first obtain q w , the probability of a given node outputting the computational result c = 1. Note that q w is the same for all nodes, since {G ji } are i.i.d. Bernoulli random variables.
For an arbitrary realization of G, suppose v data partitions are allocated to a given node. Then, the node outputs c = 1 when more than v/2 partitions have message m = 1. The probability of this event is expressed using a combinatorial term in (5) . Recall that, as state above, the estimation error event (µ =μ) occurs when more than n/2 nodes transmit y = 1. In the worst case of having y = 1 for all b Byzantine nodes, the estimation error probability P(μ = µ|m)
reduces to the probability of having more than n/2 − b nodes with c = 1. In other words,
holds. Taking the weighted sum of these terms for various m results in δ in (4).
The error bound expression for δ as given in (4) is a bit too complicated to develop useful insights. We provide a rougher but simpler bound in the following corollary that would provide better physical interpretations on the behavior of the suggested random Bernoulli codes.
Corollary 1. Consider using random Bernoulli codes with G ji ∼ Bern(p) for some p > 0. Let b be the number of Byzantine nodes. Then, in the asymptotic regime of large k, the system is (b, )-Byzantine tolerable, i.e., the error probability is upper bounded as
and q w is as in (5) .
Proof. Recall that the conditional estimation error P(μ = µ|m) for a given message vector m is bounded as in (6). Using the Markov inequality, we have
Taking the weighted sum of these terms for various message vectors m results in in (7) .
The error probability bound in Corollary 1 provides some physical intuition about how vulnerable a community with n nodes is to the attack of b Byzantine nodes. To be specific, the theorem relates two probabilities: P(μ = µ) which represents the probability that the master (aggregating the opinions of n workers) makes a wrong decision on the majority value, and P(c = µ) which represents the decision error probability of an individual node. As explained in the proof of Theorem 1, q w is the probability of a non-Byzantine node outputting a wrong decision c = µ on the majority value, for a given message vector m with m 0 = w. Thus,
is the decision error probability of a given node, when 2 n message vectors m are generated with equal probabilities. Here, (a) is from the fact that the error analysis for message vectors m satisfying m 0 > n/2 is the same as the analysis for message vectors with m 0 ≤ n/2 , as explained in footnote 2 . Now, the result of Theorem 1 can be written as
This implies that the probability P(μ = µ) of the community making a wrong decision is no more than n n/2 −b+1 times the decision error probability P(c = µ) of an individual node. Note that the scaling factor is a function of how far b n is from its maximum value 1 2 .
B. Behavior of Majority Estimation Error
The error upper bound δ in Theorem 1 as well as the simulated error P(µ =μ) are shown in Fig. 2a , when n = 49. We can check that both δ and P(µ =μ) decrease as the connection probability p increases, or equivalently, as the data allocation matrix G becomes more dense. This makes sense because as p increases, each node gets access to more data partitions on average, so that the probability of an honest (non-Byzantine) node correctly estimating the majority opinion µ increases. This decreases the estimation error regardless of the behavior of Byzantines. Simul., p=0.5 Approx, p=0.5
Simul., p=0.7 Approx., p=0.7
(b) Majority estimation error versus α = b/n, when n = 25. For each p, the approximation curve is simply C 1/2−α . Figure 2 : The behaviors of majority estimation error P(µ =μ).
are b = 3 Byzantines, it is necessary to set connection probability p ≥ 0.15 to guarantee that estimation error is less than 30%. Now, in the following corollary, we analyze the behavior of error bound as the portion of Byzantine nodes α = b/n varies. Note that Corollary 2 is directly obtained from Corollary 1 by inserting b = nα.
Corollary 2. Let α be the portion of Byzantine nodes, i.e., the number of Byzantine nodes is b = nα for some α ∈ (0, 1/2). Then, in the asymptotic regime of large n, the error bound in
Corollary 2 states that the error bound is inversely proportional to (1/2 − α) as the portion of Byzantines α = b/n varies. A very similar behavior is observed for the simulated error P(µ =μ), as shown in Fig. 2b . We can confirm that the estimation error increases as α increases, and it increases faster as the portion of Byzantines α approaches its maximum towards 1/2.
IV. SYSTEM DESIGN USING DETERMINISTIC CODES
Here we construct codes for perfect b−Byzantine tolerance, i.e., codes that tolerate any attacks from b Byzantine nodes with probability 1, when the entries of G are fixed. We use the notation G(j, :) to represent j th row of matrix G. We assume that the number of data partitions |P j | = G(j, :) 0 assigned to each node j is an odd number, to avoid ambiguous output of the majority function in (2) . For a given message vector m = [m 1 , m 2 , · · · , m n ], we define 12 which is the set of nodes with at least v partitions having messages m i = 1, out of 2v −1 allocated data partitions. Since each node takes the majority vote, we have c j = maj({m i } i∈P j ) = 1 for j ∈ J v (m). Under this setting, we define r * , the minimum required computational redundancy for perfect Byzantine tolerance.
Definition 2. Consider using a deterministic data allocation matrix G for n nodes. The minimum redundancy required for perfect b−Byzantine tolerance is defined as
where encoder E and decoder D are defined in (2) and (3), respectively.
A. Code Constructions for Perfect b−Byzantine Tolerance
In this section, we provide data allocation matrices G that satisfy the perfect b−Byzantine tolerance. To begin, we provide the necessary and sufficient condition on G to tolerate b Byzantines in a perfect manner. 
for all message vectors m having weight m 0 = n/2 .
Proof. The formal proof is in Appendix C, and here we just provide an intuitive sketch. Recall that the majority opinion is µ = 0 when the message vector m has weight m 0 ≤ n/2 .
Moreover, in the worst case attacks from b Byzantines, the output y j and the computational result c j of node j satisfy J 0 := |{j : y j = 1}| = |{j : c j = 1}| + b. Since the estimate on the majority opinion isμ = maj{y 1 , · · · , y n }, the sufficient and necessary condition for accurate estimation
Using the result of Theorem 2 which specifies the condition for perfect b−Byzantine tolerance, we now construct explicit matrices G that guarantee perfect b−Byzantine tolerance, under various 13
Input: Number of nodes n, number of Byzantine nodes b. Output: Data allocation matrix G ∈ {0, 1} n×n that achieve the perfect b−Byzantine tolerance.
Initialize G as the all-zero matrix.
Step 1: Set the top left s-by-s submatrix of G as the identity matrix, i.e., G(1 : s, 1 : s) = I s .
Step 2: Set the bottom (n − s − L) rows as the all-one matrix, i.e., G(s + L + 1 : n, :) = 1 (n−s−L)×n .
Step 3: Fill in the matrix A := G(s + 1 : s + L, s + 1 : n) as follows: Insert 2b + 1 ones on each row by shifting the location by b + 1, i.e., A(l, (l − 1)(b + 1) + (1 : 2b + 1)) = 1 1×(2b+1) for l = 1, · · · , L. Now we provide deterministic codes that guarantee perfect b−Byzantine tolerance, when
The detailed code construction rule for generating matrix G is given in Algorithm 1, and is depicted in Fig. 3 . The example codes generated by this algorithm are given in Table I .
In the theorem below, we provide the property of codes generated by Algorithm 1. The proof of this theorem is given in Appendix F. 
14 Table I : Examples of perfect b−Byzantine tolerable codes generated by Algorithm 1, when n = 5 or n = 7.
(n, b) (5,1) (7,1)
Analysis on the minimum required redundancy r * Here we provide some results on the minimum required redundancy r * for perfect Byzantine tolerance. First, we give a closed-form expression of r * when n = 5 or n = 7.
Proposition 2. The codes in Algorithm 1 has the minimum redundancy, i.e., r * = r (u) holds for r (u) in (13), when n = 5 or n = 7.
Now, we provide upper and lower bounds on r * for general n, b settings. Before stating the general bounds, we define a parameter z which is useful for specifying the lower bound.
Definition 3. For given n, b, define z := max a 1 ,a 3 ,··· ,a n−2
Note that the parameter z in (14) is the solution of a integer linear programming, which can be obtained from the simplex method [39] . In the theorem below, we provide upper and lower bounds on the minimum required redundancy r * for perfect b−Byzantine tolerance. The proof of this theorem is given in Appendix G. (13) as a closed-form solution, the lower bound r (l) = n − z n is obtained by solving the integer linear programming (LP) specified in Definition 3. We used the MATLAB function intlinprog for solving the integer LP. We set α portion of nodes to be Byzantines, i.e., b = nα. minimum required computational redundancy r * is bounded as
where the upper bound r (u) is in (13) , and the lower bound is r (l) = n − z n for z in (14) .
The upper and lower bounds are plotted in Fig. 4 . As shown in the figure, both the upper and lower bounds increase linearly with n, when the portion of Byzantines α is fixed. Thus, the minimum required redundancy r * has the same behavior. We can observe that the bounds are tighter for smaller n or larger α.
V. EXPERIMENTS ON AMAZON EC2
Here we provide experimental results of the suggested coding schemes, tested on Amazon EC2. Considering a distributed learning setup with communication across multiple nodes, we used MPI4py [40] , an open source message passing interface.
Compared Schemes. We compare the suggested coding schemes with the conventional uncoded scheme of SIGNSGD WITH MAJORITY VOTE. Similar to the simulation settings in the previous works [21] , [22] , we used the momentum counterpart SIGNUM instead of SIGNSGD for fast convergence, and used the learning rate of γ = 0.001 and the momentum term of η = 0.9. We simulated deterministic codes given in Algorithm 1, and Bernoulli codes suggested in Section III with connection probability of p. Thus, the probabilistic code have expected computational
Byzantine Attack Model. We consider the following two attack models used in related works [17] , [22] : 1) the reverse attack where a Byzantine node flips the sign of the true gradient vector, and 2) the directional attack where a Byzantine node guides the model parameter in a certain 
A. Experiments on Deep Neural Network Models
We trained a RESNET-18 model on CIFAR-10 dataset. Under this setting, the model dimension is d = 11, 173, 962, and the number of training/test samples is set to n train = 50000 and n test = 10000, respectively. We used mini-batch stochastic gradient descent; the batch size is set to B = 120 when n = 5, and set to B = 126 when n = 9. We used g4dn.xlarge instances (having a GPU at each instance) for both workers and the master. 
B. Experiments on Logistic Regression Models
We trained a logistic regression model on the Amazon Employee Access data set from Kaggle 3 , which is used in papers [32] , [41] on coded gradient computation schemes. The model dimension is set to d = 263500 after applying one-hot encoding with interaction terms. We used c4.large instances for n workers that compute batch gradients, and a single c4.2xlarge instance for the master that aggregates the gradients from workers and determines the model updating rule. 
We also define the attack vector β = [β 1 , β 2 , · · · , β n ], where β j = 1 if node j is a Byzantine and β j = 0 otherwise. The set of attack vectors with a given support b is denoted as Now we define several sets:
Using these definitions, Fig. 8 provides a description on the mapping from m toμ. Since decoder D(·) is a majority vote function, we haveμ = 1 {y∈Y + } . Moreover, we have µ = 1 {m∈M + } .
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
We begin with the following lemma, which can be obtained from the definition of y j . Now, define a randomly generated data allocation matrix G to be irregular if it has at least one all-zero row, i.e., there is a node which does not have any data partitions. Then, the estimation error can be expressed as
First, we specify the second term on the right-hand side. Let E j be the event that node j receives no data partitions. Then, P(E j ) = (1 − p) n holds. Moreover, from the independence of rows of matrix G, we obtain
as n increases. Now we focus on the first term on the right-hand side of (B.1). We first develop an upper bound on P(µ =μ | G is regular) as follows. Given that G is regular, we write
where the second last equality is from the assumption that each message vector is equally likely while the last equality holds since the analysis below for m ∈ M − can be similarly applied to 21 the case of m ∈ M + . Next, obtain an upper bound on P(μ = µ|m). For an arbitrary m ∈ M − ,
where the inequality is from Lemma B. Here, we denote the first probability term as
which can be simply calculated as
Now we obtain the following bound on P(µ =μ). When the message vector has weight w, i.e., 
The condition stated in Proposition 3 can be further simplified as follows. 
Proof. Consider arbitrary m ∈ M − . We want to prove that
holds for arbitrary β ∈ B b and arbitrary f β ∈ F β . Thus, . Then, f * β * (φ(m)) 0 = φ(m) 0 > n − b ≥ n − n/2 ≥ n/2 . Thus, we can state that 
Thus, the proof for the second case is completed, and this completes the statement of (C.2) for arbitrary m ∈ M − . Similarly, we can show that
is equivalent to φ(m) 0 > n 2 + b for arbitrary m ∈ M + . This completes the proof. 5 We can always find such β * since |S| ≥ b due to the setting of φ(m) 0 ≤ n − b. 24 Now, we further reduce the condition in Proposition 4 as follows.
Proposition 5. The perfect b−Byzantine tolerance condition in Proposition 4 is equivalent to
Proof. All we need to prove is that (C.5) implies (C.2). Assume that the mapping φ satisfies In order to prove Theorem 2, all that remains is to prove that (C.5) reduces to
Recall that φ(m) = c = [c 1 , c 2 , · · · , c n ] where c j = maj({m i } i∈P j ) and P j = {i ∈ [n] :
G ji = 1}. Moreover, we assumed that |P j | = G(j, :) 0 is an odd number. Thus, c j = 1 { G(j,:) 0 +1 ≤ 2m T G(j,:)} , and the set [n] = {1, 2, · · · , n} can be partitioned as [n] = S 1 ∪ S 2 ∪ · · · ∪ S n/2 +1 where S v := {j ∈ [n] : G(j, :) 0 = 2v − 1}. Therefore, for a given m ∈ M − , we have
Note that J v (m) for v = n/2 + 1 reduces to J n/2 +1 (m) = {j ∈ [n] : G(j, :) 0 = 2( n/2 − 1) + 1, m T G(j, :) ≥ n/2 + 1} = ∅ since m ∈ M − . Thus, combining the two equations above, we obtain the following.
Proposition 6. The perfect b−Byzantine tolerance condition in Proposition 5 is equivalent to
Now, we show that (C.7) is equivalent to (C.6). We can easily check that the former implies the latter, which is directly proven from the statements. Thus, all we need to prove is that (C.6) implies (C.7). First, when t = 0, note that |J v (m)| = 0 for ∀m ∈ M 0 , ∀v ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n/2 }, which implies that (C.7) holds trivially. Thus, in the rest of the proof, we assume that t > 0.
Consider an arbitrary t ∈ {1, 2, · · · n/2 } and an arbitrary m ∈ M t . Denote m = e i 1 + e i 2 + · · · + e it where e 1 = [1, 0, · · · , 0], e 2 = [0, 1, 0, · · · , 0], and e n = [0, · · · , 0, 1]. Moreover, consider an arbitrary m ∈ M n/2 which satisfies m i = 1 for i = i 1 , i 2 , · · · , i t . Denote m = e i 1 + · · · + e it + e j 1 + · · · + e j such that β j 0 = 0 holds. Moreover, set f β ∈ F β such that the elements of y = f β (c) is All in all, in both cases, we confirm that ∃m ∈ {0, 1} n , ∃β ∈ B b , ∃f β ∈ F β such thatμ = µ when G = 1 n×n . This proves that a system using G = 1 n×n cannot tolerate b = n/2 Byzantines.
APPENDIX E PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
We begin with the case b = 0. First, it is obvious that G 0 ≥ n since at least one data partition is assigned to each node. Next, when G = I n , we have G(j, :) 0 = v}|, which represent the number of nodes having v data partitions. Trivially, we have n v=1,v:odd s v = n. Now we begin the proof for the case of (n, b) = (5, 1). According to Theorem 2, the perfect b−Byzantine tolerance condition is equivalent to the following:
We have the following lemma on the condition of s 1 in order to satisfy (E.1).
Lemma E.1. Consider the scenario (n, b) = (5, 1). If the perfect b−Byzantine tolerance condition in (E.1) holds, then we have s 1 ≤ 1.
Proof. Suppose s 1 ≥ 2. Then there exist j 1 , j 2 ∈ [n] such that G(j 1 , :) = e i 1 and G(j 2 , :) = e i 2 for some i 1 , i 2 ∈ [n]. If i 1 = i 2 , consider a message vector m ∈ M 2 with m i 1 = 1. Then, j 1 , j 2 ∈ J 1 (m). This implies |J 1 (m)| = 2, which does not satisfy (E.1). If i 1 = i 2 , consider a message vector m = e i 1 + e i 2 which satisfies m ∈ M 2 . Then, j 1 , j 2 ∈ J 1 (m). This implies |J 1 (m)| = 2, which does not satisfy (E.1). Thus, s 1 ≥ 2 implies that the system is not perfect b−Byzantine tolerance, which completes the proof. Now we have the following lemma on the condition of s 3 in order to satisfy (E.1).
Lemma E.2. Consider the scenario of (n, b) = (5, 1). If the perfect b−Byzantine tolerance condition in (E.1) holds, then we have s 3 ≤ 2.
Proof. Suppose s 3 ≥ 3. Then there exists j 1 , j 2 , j 3 ∈ [n] such that
Define G = G([j 1 , j 2 , j 3 ], :), a matrix consisting of j 1 , j 2 , j 3 -th row vectors extracted from G.
Thus, G ∈ {0, 1} 3×5 holds. For i ∈ [5] , define a i = G (:, i) 0 , the support of the i-th column 28 of G . Then, from (E.2), we obviously have
and from the definition of a i , we have 0 ≤ a i ≤ 3 for all i ∈ [5] .
We proceed the rest of the proof for three different cases which cover all the possible scenarios.
Case I:
Consider the case of having distinct i 1 , i 2 ∈ [5] such that a i 1 = 3 and a i Case II: ∃a i 1 = 3, and a i 2 ≤ 1 for all i 2 = i 1
Consider the case where i 1 ∈ [5] with a i 1 = 3, while all other indexes i 2 ∈ [5] satisfy a i 2 ≤ 1.
In such a case, we have 5 i=1 a i = a i 1 + i 2 =i 1 a i 2 ≤ 7, which contradicts (E.3). Case III: a i ≤ 2 for all i ∈ [5] Combining with (E.3), we have at least four indexes {i p } 4 p=1 ∈ [5] such that a ip = 2. Note that since G has three rows, there are 3 2 = 3 distinct columns G (:, i p ) with weight a ip = 2. Thus, there exist distinct indexes i p , i q ∈ [5] such that G (:, i p ) = G (:, i q ) holds, which implies that G Then, for a given message vector m = e ip + e iq , we have j 1 , j 2 ∈ J 2 (m). Thus, this case cannot satisfy (E.1). All in all, when we suppose s 3 ≥ 3, all possible scenarios cannot satisfy (E.1).
Thus, the condition s 3 ≤ 2 is necessary for satisfying (E.1).
Finally, we show the following lemma stating the necessary condition on s 1 + s 3 . Proof. When s 1 = 0, Lemma E.2 directly proves this Lemma. Since s 1 ≤ 1 from Lemma E.1, all we need to consider is the case s 1 = 1. Given s 1 = 1, suppose s 3 ≥ 2. Then, there exist distinct j 1 , j 2 , j 3 ∈ [5] such that G(j 1 , :) 0 = 1 and G(j 2 , :) 0 = G(j 3 , :) 0 = 3. Note that from the pigeonhole principle, there exists at least one i ∈ [5] which satisfies G(j 2 , i) = G(j 3 , i) = 1. In 29 other words, |S| ≥ 1 holds for S = {i ∈ [5] : G j 2 ,i = G j 3 ,i = 1}.
We proceed with the rest of the proof for two different cases which would cover all possible scenarios.
Case I (when |S| ≥ 2): Let i 1 , i 2 ∈ S. Then, G([j 2 , j 3 ], [i 1 , i 2 ]) = 1 2×2 holds. Then, for a given vector m = e i 1 + e i 2 , we have j 2 , j 3 ∈ J 2 (m). Thus, this case does not satisfy (E.1).
Case II (when |S| = 1): Note that
holds. This implies that for arbitrary i ∈ [n], either G(j 2 , i) = 1 or G(j 3 , i) = 1 holds.
Recall that G(j 1 , :) 0 = 1 holds. Thus, G(j 1 , i 1 ) = 1 holds for some i 1 ∈ [5] . Moreover, either G(j 2 , i 1 ) = 1 or G(j 3 , i 1 ) = 1 holds. Without a loss of generality, assume that G(j 2 , i 1 ) = 1 holds. Since G(j 2 , :) 0 = 3, there exists i 2 ∈ [5] such that G(j 2 , i 2 ) = 1. Therefore, we
Thus, for a given message vector m = e i 1 + e i 2 , we have j 1 ∈ J 1 (m) and j 2 ∈ J 2 (m). Thus, this case does not satisfy (E.1). All in all, given s 1 = 1, we require s 3 ≤ 1 to satisfy (E.1). This completes the proof. This has computational redundancy of G 0 /n = 19/5 = 3.8, which can be achieved by using a matrix in Table I with (s 1 , s 3 ) = (1, 1). This completes the proof for (n, b) = (5, 1). Using a similar analysis, we can obtain results for n = 7. Note that we have
from Fig. 3 . Thus, the condition in (F.1) reduces to
Now all that remains is to show that (F.3) holds for arbitrary message vector m ∈ M n−1
2
.
Consider a message vector m ∈ Mn−1 2 denoted as m = [m 1 , m 2 , · · · , m n ]. Here, we note that Second, we show that v * q ≥ b + q holds for all q ∈ {0, 1, · · · , L}, which completes the proof. The expression for v * q can be obtained as follows. Fig. 9 supports the explanation. Proof. From Fig. 9 and the definition of v * q , all we need to prove is the following statement: for all m ∈ M (q) ∩ (M gather ) c , denoted as m = [m 1 , m 2 , · · · , m n ]. Then, there exist integers j ∈ {1, · · · , L} and δ ∈ {2, 3, · · · , L − j} such that s + j, s + j + δ ∈ J b+1 (m) and s + j + 1, · · · , s + j + δ − 1 / ∈ J b+1 (m) hold. Select the smallest j which satisfies the condition. Consider m = [m 1 , · · · , m n ] generated as the following rule:
1) The first s + j(b + 1) elements (which affect the first j rows of A in Figure 3 ) of m is identical to that of m.
2) The last n − (j + δ − 1)(b + 1) − s elements of m are shifted to the left by (δ − 1)(b + 1), and inserted to m . In the shifting process, we have b locations where the original m i and the shifted m i+(δ−1)(b+1) overlap. In such locations, m i is set to the maximum of two elements;
if either one is 1, we set m i = 1, and otherwise we set m i = 0.
This can be mathematically expressed as below:
where Eq.(a) is from
holds for
which is a non-negative integer from (F.14). Now, we show the behavior of J b+1 (m) as follows.
Recall that for j 0 ∈ {s + 1, · · · , s + L}, From (F.12) and (F.17), we have
Thus, we have Randomly select − 0 elements in S 1 , denoted as {i 1 , · · · , i − 0 } = S Note that in both cases, the weight of m is
Moreover, |J b+1 (m )| gather , define m = [m 1 , m 2 , · · · , m n ] as in Algorithm 2. In line 9 of this algorithm, we can always find l ∈ [s] that satisfies m l = 0, due to the following reason. 36 Note that
holds where (a) is from the fact that G(j, i) = 0 for i ∈ [s] as in (F.17). Thus, we have
Therefore, there exists l ∈ [s] such that m l = 0.
The vector m generated from Algorithm 2 satisfies the following four properties:
The first property is from the fact that lines 7 and 10 of the algorithm maintains the weight of the message vector to be m 0 = (n − 1)/2. The second property is from the fact that for j 0 ∈ {j, j +1, · · · , j +δ −1}, where (a) is from the fact that 2b+1 i=1 m s+(j 0 −s−1)(b+1)+i = 2b+1 holds if line 6 of Algorithm 2 is not satisfied. The third property is from the first two properties and the definition of M According to Lemma F.2, in order to find v * q , all that remains is to find the optimal m ∈ M = v(m )
where (a) is from (F.33) and Lemma F. Proof. Note that r * ≤ r (u) is obtained directly from Theorem 3 and the definition of r * . Thus, all that remains is to show r * ≥ r (l) . For a given allocation matrix G ∈ {0, 1} n×n , define a l := n j=1 1 { G(j,:) 0 =l} . Since n and G(j, :) 0 are assumed to be an odd number, we have a 2 = a 4 = · · · = a n−1 = 0. Thus, we have n (a) = n l=1 a l = a 1 + a 3 + · · · + a n−2 + a n (G.1)
where Eq.(a) is from 1 ≤ G(j, :) 0 ≤ n. The redundancy factor of matrix G can be written as r = (# of 1's in G) n = a 1 + 3a 3 + · · · + na n n = n(a 1 + a 3 + · · · + a n ) − {(n − 1)a 1 + (n − 3)a 3 + · · · + 2a n−2 + 0 · a n } n (G.1) = n − (n − 1)a 1 + (n − 3)a 3 + · · · + 2a n−2 n .
(G.2)
For a given assignment vector defined as a = (a 1 , a 3 , · · · , a n ), we denote the redundancy as r = r(a). Recall that according to Theorem 2 in the main manuscript, a system with matrix G is perfect b−Byzantine tolerable if it satisfies
for all m ∈ M (n−1)/2 . Thus, whether a system with data allocation matrix G satisfies the perfect b-Byzantine tolerance of a system is determined by the corresponding assignment vector a = (a 1 , a 3 , · · · , a n ). Now we prove that constraints in Theorem 4 are the necessary conditions 40 on {a 2t−1 } (n−1)/2 t=1 for perfect b−Byzantine tolerance. Note that the last two constraints in Theorem 4 are trivial necessary conditions. Thus, proving for the first two inequalities is enough. First, we prove a 1 ≤ n−1 2 − b is required for perfect b−Byzantine tolerance. Suppose a 1 > n−1 2 − b. Denote the set of j ∈ [n] that satisfies G(j, :) 0 = 1 as {j 1 , j 2 , · · · , j a 1 }. Moreover, for p ∈ [a 1 ], define i p as the unique integer satisfying G(j p , i p ) = 1. Consider an arbitrary m ∈ M (n−1)/2 satisfying m i = 1 for i ∈ {i 1 , i 2 , · · · , i a 1 }. Then, m T G(j p , :) ≥ m ip G(j p , i p ) holds for p ∈ [a 1 ], which results in j 1 , j 2 , · · · , j a 1 ∈ J 1 (m). Thus, we have 
